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INTRODUCTION
In July 2017, Salt Lake County, Duchesne County, Uintah County, and
Washington County (the “Counties”) filed a declaratory judgment action
challenging the constitutionality of three tax laws (the “Challenged Laws”).
Specifically, they challenged Utah Code sections 59-2-201(4) (“Valuation
Law”), 59-2-804 (“Allocation Law”), and 59-2-1007(2)(b) (“Threshold Law”).
The district court dismissed the challenge to the Threshold Law on ripeness
grounds, and the challenges to the Valuation and Allocation Laws for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Court should affirm the judgment dismissing the Counties’ claims.
First, the district court correctly determined that the Counties did not plead
facts sufficient to show their challenge to the Threshold Law was ripe. In
fact, as the district court correctly observed, the “Complaint does not contain
any allegations regarding the application of the Review Threshold Law.” (R.
912).
Likewise, the district court correctly dismissed the challenges to the
Valuation Law and Allocation Law for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, for the reasons set forth in the Intervenors’ initial brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1: Did the district court correctly dismiss as unripe the Counties’
challenge to the Threshold Law because, among other things, their
Complaint does not contain any allegations about the application of the
Threshold Law?
Preservation: The State preserved this issue and the district court
addressed it. (R. 908-916). And the Counties have raised this issue on
appeal and have shown it was preserved for review. Appellants’ Br. at 2.
Standard of review: The Court applies the correction of error
standard to a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on ripeness
grounds. Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1993).
Issue 2: Did the district court correctly dismiss the Counties’ claims
regarding the Valuation Law and Allocation Law because the Counties failed
to exhaust administrative remedies?
Preservation: The Counties have raised this issue on appeal and
have shown it was preserved for review. Appellants’ Br. at 3.
Standard of review: “A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss . . .
presents a question of law that we review for correctness.” D.A. Osguthorpe v.
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, ¶ 10, 232 P.3d 999 (citations
omitted). “The grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed
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under the same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss[.]” Golding v.
Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The constitutionality of the Challenged Laws is not before the Court
because the district court dismissed the Counties’ claims without reaching
the merits. Even so, the State briefly describes the Challenged Laws to put
the Counties’ claims in context.
Challenges to the Valuation Law
The Valuation Law was enacted in 2017 as Senate Bill 157. It changed,
among other things, how the Utah State Tax Commission (“Tax
Commission”) determines commercial aircraft value. Utah Code § 59-2201(4). Subject to some exceptions, the Valuation Law requires the Tax
Commission to use an aircraft price guide to determine the fair market value
of aircraft that is assessed under part 2 of chapter 59. Id. § 59-2-201(4)(b)(i).
An aircraft price guide is like a Kelley Blue Book for commercial aircraft—it
is “a nationally recognized publication that assigns value estimates for
individual commercial aircraft that are: (i) identified by year, make, and
model; and (ii) in average condition typical for the aircraft’s type and
vintage.” Id. § 59-2-201(4)(a).
The Valuation Law requires the Tax Commission to use the airliner
price guide as the specific aircraft price guide unless it “is no longer published
3

or the commission determines that another aircraft pricing guide more
reasonably reflects the fair market value of the aircraft,” or “if the
commission: (i) has clear and convincing evidence that the aircraft values
reflected in the aircraft pricing guide do not reasonably reflect fair market
value of the aircraft; and (ii) cannot identify an alternative aircraft pricing
guide from which the commission may determine aircraft value.” Id. §§ 59-2201(4)(b)(ii)(A) and (4)(d).
In their Complaint, the Counties allege that the clear and convincing
evidence standard of section 201(4)(d)(i) is unconstitutional because it
prevents uniformity, prevents finding fair market value, is an
unconstitutional delegation of authority, and violates separation of powers.
(R. 20-22, 24-25). Thus, the Counties do not challenge the use of an aircraft
price guide per se, only the application of the “clear and convincing”
evidentiary standard as a prerequisite for the Tax Commission to use an
alternative aircraft pricing guide or alternative method. See id.
The Counties also challenge a provision of the Valuation Law that is
identified as a “fleet adjustment.” The fleet adjustment provides that, “[t]o
reflect the value of an aircraft fleet that is used as part of the operating
property of an airline, air charter service, or air contract service, the fair
market value of the aircraft shall include a fleet adjustment . . . .” Utah Code
§ 59-2-201(4)(c)(i). The fleet adjustment is determined either by the aircraft
4

price guide, if the guide provides for a fleet adjustment, or “by reducing the
aircraft pricing guide value of each aircraft in the fleet by .5% for each
aircraft over three aircraft up to a maximum 20% reduction.” Id. § 59-2201(4)(c)(ii)–(c)(iii).
The Counties contend that the fleet adjustment is unconstitutional
because it prevents uniformity, prevents finding fair market value, is an
unconstitutional delegation of authority, and violates separation of powers.
(R. 22-25).
Challenge to the Allocation Law
The Allocation Law was enacted as Senate Bill 237 in 2008. The
Counties challenge a provision of the Allocation Law that determines how the
Utah portion of an airline’s total value is allocated to the State. (R. 6, ¶
11(b)).
Under the Allocation Law, airline value is allocated to individual states
according to two factors: the revenue ton miles factor (generally how much an
airline’s aircraft are in a state’s skies) and the ground hours factor (generally
how much an airline’s aircraft are on the ground in a state). Utah Code § 592-804; (R. 17, ¶ 71).
In the Complaint, the Counties limit their challenge to the revenue ton
miles factor. (R. 18, ¶ 72). Utah law defines revenue ton miles the same as
the Code of Federal Regulations, which states that a revenue ton mile is one
5

ton of revenue traffic transported one mile. See 14 CFR 298.2. Revenue tonmiles are computed by multiplying the aircraft-miles flown on each flight
stage by the number of pounds of revenue traffic carried on that flight stage
and converted to ton-miles by dividing total revenue pound-miles by 2,000
pounds. Id. An airline’s total revenue ton-miles are then divided, or
apportioned, to Utah according to “the total revenue ton miles within the
borders of this state: (i) during a calendar year . . . and (ii) from flight stages
that originate or terminate in this state.” Utah Code § 59-2-804(1)(k).
The Allocation Law defines the challenged revenue ton miles factor as:
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈ℎ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑋𝑋 .5
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

Utah Code §59-2-804(1)(i). As mentioned previously, .5 is used here because
the other half of the equation is the ground hours factor. The Counties
contend that the interstate allocation factor is unconstitutional because it
prevents uniformity, and is a de facto exemption. (R. 25-26).
Challenge to the Threshold Law
The Threshold Law was enacted in 2015 as Senate Bill 165. The
Counties challenge a provision of the Threshold Law that limits counties’
ability to challenge an assessment to situations where the county reasonably
believes the commission should have assessed the property at a value 50%
greater than the assessment for the current calendar year or the prior
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calendar year. Utah Code § 59-2-1007(2)(b); (R. 20, ¶81). To object, a county
must either apply to the Commission to become a party to a hearing set as a
result of an owner’s objection to the assessment, or if the owner does not
object, by applying to the Commission for a hearing on the county’s objection
within a specified time. Id. § 59-2-1007(2). The 50% requirement applies only
when a county objects on its own, not for a county to join a taxpayer’s
objection. Id.
In their Complaint, the Counties allege that the limitation in Utah
Code § 59-2-1007(2) violates the Utah Constitution’s Open Courts Clause and
prevents uniformity. (R. 26-27).
Allegations in the Complaint about 2017 Tax Year
The Complaint alleges these facts about the 2017 tax year:
• “[T]he [Property] Tax Division (“Division”) in 2017 was required by the
methodology set forth by the Legislature in SB157 [the Valuation Law]
to value airlines at an average of 39% less than what their values
would have been using 2016 methods—for a total loss in airline tax
revenues of roughly $5 million.” (R. 5, ¶ 7).
• “The assessments issued by the State Tax Commission for the January
1, 2017, lien date for the seven major passenger airlines utilized the
SB157-required valuation method, rather than the preferred valuation
methods used by the Tax Commission for the 2016 assessments. This
7

significantly affected the assessed value of Airline Property. For
example, application of Utah Code section 59-2-201(4), as amended,
reduced the 2017 assessed system value of one airline from $26.2
billion to less than $14.7 billion (a roughly 44% decrease).” (R. 15, ¶
58).
• “By applying the SB157 methodology rather than applying the
methodologies used the previous year, the 2017 Utah taxable values for
the seven major passenger airlines decreased by roughly 39% overall.”
(R. 15, ¶ 59).
• “Had the Tax Commission used the preferred valuation methods it used
in 2016 instead of the SB157 methodology, the 2017 Utah taxable
values for the seven major airlines would be on average 43% higher.”
(R. 15, ¶ 60).
Proceedings in the District Court
The State moved to dismiss the Counties’ complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, (R. 282-95), arguing that the Counties had failed to plead
facts in their Complaint showing that their claims against the Challenged
Laws were ripe. (R. 290). More specifically, the State argued that “without
specific facts and a specific assessment, there is no case or controversy before
the Court.” (Id.)
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The Counties opposed the State’s motion, contending, among other
things, that the “unconstitutional [sic] questions [presented by their
Complaint] are not limited to any one particular assessment[.]” (R. 370).
And, in their opposition, the Counties did not identify any particular
assessment affected by the Challenged Laws. To the contrary, as the State
observed in its reply memorandum with respect to the Threshold Law,
Plaintiffs have not identified any particular
assessment at issue or argued that the Tax
Commission rejected their challenge based on the
50% threshold. Nor do Plaintiffs contend that they
chose to not challenge a certain assessment because
of the 50% threshold.
(R. 464).
After the Court allowed Delta Air Lines, Inc., and SkyWest Airlines,
Inc. (collectively, the “Airlines”), to intervene, they filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, arguing the Counties had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. (R. 562-82).
The district court heard oral arguments on both motions. (R. 908).
More than one month later, the Counties filed a “Notice of
Supplemental Authority” (“Notice”) stating that on March 28, 2018, the Tax
Commission “granted summary judgment and dismissed four pending
administrative appeals [brought by Salt Lake County] related to taxation of
airline property.” (R. 750-51). In the Notice, the Counties further stated,

9

“These recent decisions by the Commission demonstrate that the issues of
constitutionality are ripe for this Court's consideration and that there is
simply no administrative remedy available for the Tax Commission to resolve
those challenges.” (R. 752).
Attached to the Notice were Tax Commission orders dismissing four tax
appeals for the same reason–the challenges failed to meet the 50% threshold
in the Threshold Law. (R. 755-82). The Tax Commission did not consider the
Valuation and Allocations Laws in those orders. (Id.) The Counties
acknowledged in the Notice that Salt Lake County had 30 days from March
28, 2018, to appeal the Tax Commission’s orders to the district court. (R.
752).
In response to the Notice, on April 5, 2018, the district court asked the
parties to submit supplemental briefs within two weeks “to inform the Court
of their positions as to whether and how the recent Commission decisions
may affect their arguments on the pending Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.” (R. 789). The parties timely filed their
supplemental briefs. (R. 791-99, 803-09, 813-22).
A few months later, the Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss as
to the Threshold Law but denied it as to the Valuation and Allocation Laws.
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(R. 908-916). Agreeing with the State that the challenge to the Threshold
Law was not ripe, the district court stated: 1
[T]he Complaint does not contain any allegations regarding the
application of the Review Threshold Law. For instance, the
Complaint does not allege that the Counties attempted to appeal
an assessment but could not because of the 50% limitation
imposed by the Review Threshold Law. Although the
Commission dismissed four appeals under § 59-2-1 007(2)(b)
since the Complaint in this case was filed, the Court agrees with
the State that this does not fix the deficiencies in the Counties'
Complaint. The Complaint does not specifically reference any
of the dismissed appeals or otherwise identify a specific
assessment or Commission decision that creates a justiciable
controversy regarding the Review Threshold Law. See e.g.
Complaint 77-82 and 121-124.
Because Plaintiffs have not identified a specific instance in
which they were denied the opportunity to pursue an appeal of an
airline assessment under the Review Threshold Law, their
constitutional claims as to that law are not ripe for adjudication
and must be dismissed. Baird v. State, 574 P .2d 713, 716 (Utah
1978) (“When it is ascertained that there is no jurisdiction in the
court because of the absence of a justiciable controversy, then the
court can go no further, and its immediate duty is to dismiss the
action.”).
(R. 912-13) (emphasis added).
With respect to the Valuation and Allocation Laws, the district court
observed that the “Complaint does not set forth the specifics of a particular
assessment . . . .” (R. 912). But the district court declined to conclude that
the Counties’ constitutional claims as to these laws were unripe. Rather, the

The district court referred to the Threshold Law as the “Review Threshold
Law.”

1
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district court concluded that a “justiciable controversy exists” because the
Complaint in this case “alleges that the Commission used the Valuation and
Allocation Laws to determine airline assessments in 2017, which resulted in
reduced tax revenue from airlines.” (R. 912).
Yet, the district court dismissed the challenges to the Valuation and
Allocation Laws for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as argued by
the Airlines in their motion for judgment on the pleadings. (R. 562-87).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court properly dismissed the Counties’ challenge to the
Threshold Law as unripe. Even under notice pleading, a plaintiff must plead
facts sufficient to show subject matter jurisdiction. One essential element of
subject matter jurisdiction is ripeness. But, as the district court correctly
determined, the Counties’ complaint was devoid of allegations addressing the
ripeness of the Threshold Law challenge. Thus, the district court correctly
dismissed this challenge. The Tax Commission orders that the Counties
introduced late in the proceedings at best support granting the Counties
leave to amend. But the Counties did not seek leave to amend.
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The district court also correctly dismissed the Counties’ challenges to
the Valuation and Allocation Laws for failure for exhaust administrative
remedies, as demonstrated by the Airlines in their brief. 2
ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Dismissed as Unripe the
Counties’ Challenge to the Threshold Law
The district court correctly granted the State’s motion to dismiss the
Counties’ challenge to the Threshold Law on ripeness grounds. A claim may
be dismissed for a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). Courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a
justiciable controversy between adverse parties. Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT
6, ¶ 29, 323 P.3d 571 (citing Williams v. Univ. of Utah, 626 P.2d 500, 503
(Utah 1981)). A controversy is not justiciable unless it is ripe. Id., ¶ 30.
These principles apply equally to declaratory judgment actions. That
is, like other actions, declaratory judgment actions must satisfy the requisite
jurisdictional requirements, including ripeness. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d
1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (stating that “before the district court can proceed in

The State adopts by reference the facts, arguments, and legal authorities
set forth in the Airlines’ brief, see Utah R. App. P. 24(c), with the following
qualifications: To the extent the Airlines’ Brief describes possible Tax
Commission factual findings or applications of the challenged statutes that
show the benefits of exhaustion, the State is not adopting those possible
findings or applications. The Tax Commission requires an opportunity to
hear those arguments on the merits before making a determination.

2
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an action for declaratory judgment: 1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; . . . and (4) the issues between the parties must be ripe for
judicial determination.”) (citation omitted).
Because an action must be justiciable and ripe for a party to be entitled
to relief, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show its claims are
justiciable and ripe, consistent with notice pleading requirements. This
conclusion follows from Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires
plaintiffs to plead facts sufficient to show “that the party is entitled to relief.”
See also Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT
75, ¶ 60, 416 P.3d 401.
Thus, a complaint that does not allege facts sufficient to show standing,
ripeness, or any other element of subject matter jurisdiction, is subject to
dismissal. See Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of W. Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶¶ 3033, 424 P.3d 95, 106. For example, in Alpine Homes, this Court affirmed an
order granting a motion to dismiss on standing grounds because there was no
showing in the complaint that the plaintiffs sustained a direct and
redressable injury. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.
A. The district court did not err in holding that the Counties
failed to allege facts showing their Review Threshold
challenge is ripe
The district court correctly determined that the Counties’ failed to
plead facts sufficient to show their claims against the Threshold Law are
14

ripe. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court has stated that
“[t]o render the constitutionality of [a tax law] ripe for adjudication, the
Counties must produce a tax assessment that has been challenged and
reduced under the [challenged act] with a resulting loss of revenue to the
relevant county. In the absence of such a reduced assessment, [the court’s]
hands are tied because a justiciable controversy necessarily involves an
accrued state of facts as opposed to a hypothetical state of facts.” Salt Lake
County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1996) (citation and quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, under Bangerter, a challenge to a
tax law is not ripe without a tax assessment that has been challenged and
reduced under the challenged law.
To be sure, the procedural posture here differs from the posture in
Bangerter. In the context of a motion to dismiss at the pleadings stage, the
Counties are not required to produce a reduced tax assessment; rather, the
Counties must allege facts in their complaint showing that there was a
specific tax assessment to which the Threshold Law was applied to their
detriment.
The Counties failed to allege such facts, and thus the district court
correctly dismissed the Counties’ challenges to the Threshold Law as unripe.
(R. 911-913). In fact, as the district court correctly observed, the Counties’
“Complaint does not contain any allegations regarding the application of the
15

Review Threshold Law.” (Id. at 912-13). And, further, “the Complaint does
not allege that the Counties attempted to appeal an assessment but could not
because of the 50% limitation imposed by the Review Threshold Law.” (Id. at
912-13).
But the Counties argue that the district court erroneously relied on
Bangerter because the court supposedly “misse[d] the point of the Counties’
unconstitutional challenge to the Threshold Law.” Appellants’ Br. at 6, 11.
The point of the Counties’ challenge, they say, is that the Threshold Law is
allegedly “facially unconstitutional and belies principles of uniformity.”
Appellants’ Br. at 2. As such, the Counties argue, the district court erred by
focusing on their failure to “specify concrete action” in their Complaint as
“opposed to the language on the face of the statute itself.” Appellants’ Br. at
6. And the Counties further argue that it “smacks of legislative overreach” to
“depriv[e] the Counties of the ability to challenge the entirety of the statutory
scheme unless and until it can allege facts to show that the scheme which is
unconstitutional on its face has also been unconstitutionally applied.”
Appellants’ Br. at 9.
The Counties are mistaken. As Bangerter illustrates, the fact that the
Counties are raising a facial challenge does not relieve the Counties of their
burden to plead facts showing their challenge is ripe based on the application
of the challenged law to a specific assessment. Although the Court did not
16

use the term “facial” in Bangerter, that case plainly involved a facial
challenge: the counties in Bangerter sought a declaratory judgment that
Utah Code § 59–2–1004(3)(d) (the “Equalization Act”) “violates article XIII,
section 3 of the Utah Constitution, which requires that property be assessed
at its fair market value.” Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 385. Yet, despite the facial
challenge, this Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the counties’
complaint on ripeness grounds because they had not produced a reduced
assessment. Id.
The Counties try but fail to distinguish Bangerter. They contend that
Bangerter “involved a statutory remedy under the Equalization Act that
could be applied only if and when invoked by the taxpayer,” and “the county
could not show the remedy had ever been, or would ever be, invoked.”
Appellants’ Br. at 11. But, contrary to the Counties’ assertion, this was not
the reason this Court stated the matter was unripe. Rather, it was the
“absence of . . . reduced assessment” that caused the Court to declare the
matter unripe. Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 385.
Bangerter’s ripeness principles apply equally in this case’s posture
because subject matter jurisdiction must exist at every stage of a case. See
Brown v. Div. of Water Rights of Dep’t of Nat. Resources, 2010 UT 14, ¶ 13,
228 P.3d 747. The nature of the challenge, the parties, and the requested
relief in Bangerter are strikingly similar to this case. In Bangerter, “[t]he
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Counties maintain[ed] that the Act violate[d] article XIII, section 3 of the
Utah constitution, which requires that property be assessed at its fair market
value.” Id. The Counties bring a similar facial challenge here. In Bangerter,
Salt Lake County “and the Utah Association of Counties” sued the State of
Utah, specifically the Tax Commission. Id. Virtually the same is true here.
And in Bangerter the counties sought “a declaratory judgment that [the
challenged law] [was] unconstitutional.” Id. The same is true here. Thus, the
district court was correct to rely on the rule in Bangerter, notwithstanding
the difference in its procedural posture.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding
the State’s motion to dismiss based only on the allegations in
the complaint
Approximately one month after oral argument on the State’s motion to
dismiss and the Airlines’ motion for judgment of the pleadings, the Counties
filed a “Notice of Supplemental Authority” to which they attached orders
dismissing four Tax Commission appeals for failure to meet the 50%
threshold of the Threshold Law. (R.751-82). The Counties argued in the
Notice that these orders “demonstrate that the issues of constitutionality are
ripe.” (R. 752). After allowing the parties to submit supplement briefing on
the import of these orders to the pending motions, the Court partially
granted the State’s motion on the basis of the insufficiency of the Counties’
pleadings relating to the ripeness of the Threshold Law challenge. (R. 913).
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The Counties argue that the district court’s “disregard of [this]
subsequent factual evidence,” i.e., the four Tax Commission orders, was
“error when reviewing the claim under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)”
because a court “should consider materials outside the pleadings, including
supplemental factual allegations” under Rule 12(b)(1). Appellants’ Br. at 12.
The Counties put it too strongly. This is a question of discretion, not
correctness. That is, a district court has the discretion to consider evidence
outside the complaint in deciding motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) to
(5). See Nevares v. Adoptive Couple, 2016 UT 39, ¶ 25, 384 P.3d 213 (“A
district court can consider evidence outside the pleadings on a rule 12(b)(1)
motion without converting it to a motion for summary judgment.”) (emphasis
added); cf. Coombs v. Juice Works Dev. Inc., 2003 UT App 388, ¶ 7, 81 P.3d
769, (stating a “court may consider facts alleged outside the complaint” in
reviewing a rule 12(b)(3) motion) (emphasis added).
It does not appear Utah appellate courts have had the opportunity to
provide much guidance on the contours of a district court’s discretion with
respect to extrinsic facts in deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. But the following
guidance from a persuasive authority supports the conclusion that the
district court acted within its discretion in dismissing the complaint.
If the allegations are not sufficient . . . the district
judge has at least two possible courses of action.
When the pleader’s affidavits or other evidence show
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either that the court actually has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case or that the nonmoving
party might be able to amend to allege jurisdiction,
the district court may deny the motion and direct the
pleader to amend the pleading or it may dismiss with
leave to amend within a prescribed period of time.
Only when the affidavits show that the pleader
cannot truthfully amend to allege subject matter
jurisdiction should the court dismiss without leave to
replead.
5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1350 (3d ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
Based on this guidance, having correctly determined that the
allegations regarding the Threshold Law were insufficient, the district court
acted within its discretion when it dismissed the “claims regarding the
Review Threshold Law without prejudice.” (R. 913). The Tax Commission’s
Orders are relevant only to the issue of whether the counties should have
leave to amend. And, the Counties did not request leave to amend.
The Counties have overlooked something else. The Counties describe
the Tax Commission’s Orders as “subsequent factual evidence.” Appellants’
Br. at 12. But the Counties have not shown that Utah law allows them to
rely on events that occurred after the filing of the complaint to establish
ripeness. See Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978) (“Generally,
courts have held that the conditions which must exist before a declaratory
judgment action can be maintained are: . . . the issues between the parties
involved must be ripe for judicial determination.”) (emphasis added);
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Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1993) (“While it is
entirely possible that the matter might have matured into a full-blown
controversy at a later time, no actual conflict existed when Barnard
commenced his lawsuit.”).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court’s
dismissal of the Counties’ Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Andrew Dymek
DAVID N. WOLF
LARON LIND
ANDREW DYMEK
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for State of Utah
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